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Abstract: This paper analyzes the sources of Singapore’s GDP and labor productivity 
growth in 1965–2008 and reveals insights into related trends and patterns. The study 
documents four main findings. Firstly, both GDP and average labor productivity 
(ALP) growth in Singapore tended to decline during this period, and the contribution 
of ALP growth to GDP growth tended to decrease over time. Secondly, the 
contribution of labor to GDP growth was rather stable at approximately 1.5–2 
percentage points per year, of which an increasing share came from foreign labor. 
Thirdly, total factor productivity growth improved substantially after the mid-1980s 
and has become a healthy source of GDP and ALP growth since that time. Finally, 
Singapore’s ALP low growth and its declining trends have become notable recently, 
of which the main reason was a sharp decrease in the contribution of capital 
deepening. The study discusses the challenges facing Singapore’s sharply declining 
ALP growth rate and proposes policy approaches that might help boost the country’s 
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1. Introduction 
The outstanding economic performance of Singapore and the other Asian “tiger 
economies” (Hong Kong, Korea, and Taiwan) during the past five decades has 
attracted a great deal of attention from researchers and policy-makers around the 
world. One way to gain insights into the performance of these economies is to 
decompose their growth into the contribution of productive factors (capital and labor) 
and the increase in total factor productivity (TFP). This makes it possible to capture 
the growth in combined productivity of production inputs and the contribution of 
unobservable factors. 
 
Early studies of the sources of economic growth in “tiger economies” revealed 
shocking information about the East Asian growth model: TFP growth was found to 
be unusually low in comparison with output growth which was remarkably high. This 
paradox is particularly striking in the case of Singapore, where TFP growth was 
marginal even though output growth was well above 8% in the periods under study 
(Table 1).  
 
Table 1. Singapore’s output and TFP growth from selected studies 
Unit: % 




Tsao (1985)* 1970–1979 8.3 0.08 
Young (1995) 1966–1990 8.7 0.2 
Kim and Lau (1994) 1964–1990 8.9 0.4 
    Note: * This study was focused on the manufacturing sector 
 
Young (1995) concludes that whereas “the growth of output […] in the newly 
industrialized countries is virtually unprecedented, the growth of TFP in these 
economies is not.” Kim and Lau (1994) argued that “the hypothesis that there has 
been no technical progress during the postwar period cannot be rejected for the four 
East Asian newly industrialized countries.” Based on these results, Krugman (1994) 
adopts a bluntly pessimistic view of the East Asian growth model. He compares the 
growth patterns in these economies with those of the Soviet Union, which also 
achieved outstanding growth through rapid input accumulation for an extended period 
prior to a period of economic stagnation and its eventual collapse in 1991, and 
projected: “…from the perspective of the year 2010, current projections of Asian 
supremacy extrapolated from recent trends may well look almost as silly as 1960-
vintage forecasts of Soviet industrial supremacy did from the perspective of the 
Brezhnev years.” (Krugman, 1994, p. 78) 
 
Interestingly, in 2010, Singapore’s GDP growth peaked at 14.8%, having achieved 
among its best single-year performance figures from the past four decades. Although 
Krugman’s projection has turned out incorrect, it calls for a better understanding of 
the pattern of Singapore’s growth in the past and the challenges that Singapore is 
facing to maintain its high performance in the future. This study aims to perform these 
tasks, and toward that end, this paper will proceed as follows: Section 2 highlights the 
salient features of Singapore’s economic growth since 1965 and the challenges the 
country is facing in sustaining its high performance. Section 3 introduces the 
framework used to decompose Singapore’s sources of GDP and average labor 
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productivity (ALP) growth. Section 4 presents the results achieved along with 
relevant insights. Section 5 discusses policy issues and recommendations.  
 
2. Singapore’s economic growth, 1965–2010: salient features and challenges 
ahead 
2.1. Salient features 
Singapore’s economic growth from 1965 to 2010 can be broadly understood by 
dividing that time-span into four shorter periods: 1965–1980, 1980–1990, 1990–2000, 
and 2000–2010 (Figure 1). The first two periods, 1965–1980 and 1980–1990, were 
characterized by government efforts to use export-led industrialization and rapid 
capital accumulation to promote quantitative growth. In the first period (1965–1980), 
the government’s main policy objectives were to promote growth by attracting foreign 
direct investment (FDI), create jobs and expand productive capacity (Peebles and 
Wilson, 1996). During this period, Singapore achieved rapid growth. However, its 
economy was also affected by the worldwide recession of 1974–1975, which had 
been caused by the 1973 oil crisis. Singapore’s growth in the second period (1980–
1990) was shaped by government policies launched in the late 1970s and early 1980s 
to restructure industry by focusing on high-tech manufacturing and high value-added 
services.1 A deep recession began in 1985 that was partly caused by a slump in global 
demand, especially from the US (Rigg, 1988).  
 
Figure 1. Singapore’s Annual and 10-Year Moving Average Growth, 1965–2010 
 
 
Data source: Singapore Department of Statistics 
 
The two periods after 1990 were influenced by the government’s strategic plan to 
transform Singapore into a developed nation, which emphasized qualitative 
                                                
1 These policies were initiated in 1979 (Peebles and Wilson, 1996). 
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development.2 These two periods, and especially the 2000–2010 period, were also 
affected by the accelerated pace of globalization, the rapid penetration of information 
technology, and increasing turbulence in the world economy. Factors that had a 
tremendous impact include the Asian financial crisis of 1997–1998, the global 
recession caused by the dot-com crash in 2000, the 9-11 terrorist attack in 2001, and 
the 2008–2009 global economic crisis (Figure 1).  
 
Singapore’s economic growth throughout these four periods included three salient 
features: government intervention, vulnerability to external shocks, and resilience. 
 
Government intervention: The government’s interventionist policy has had a powerful 
effect on the dynamics of growth. Since achieving independence, the Singaporean 
government has adopted interventionist policies to promote economic growth and 
development. These policies range from attracting and cultivating FDI to promoting 
domestic businesses and from targeting strategic industries to upgrading the factor 
conditions. These policies have evolved over time and had a significant effect on 
Singapore’s growth trajectory.  
 
Vulnerability to external shocks: The Singapore economy is highly vulnerable to 
external shocks. Due to the characteristics of the economy (lack of natural resources, 
the legacy of dependence on entrepot trade3) and the government’s development 
strategy, Singapore has a large and export-reliant manufacturing sector.4 Its major 
industries, including electronics, petroleum, chemicals, and shipbuilding, are large 
scale and highly cyclical. As a result, any significant turmoil in the external 
environment can have severe adverse effects on Singapore’s economy.  
 
Resilience: Singapore’s economy has demonstrated its excellent resilience with the 
ability to recover robustly from every of the five major shocks it has suffered: the 
1973–1975 oil crisis, the 1985 global trade slowdown, the 1997–1998 Asian financial 
crisis, the 2000-2001 recession due to the consequences of the dotcom burst and the 
9-11 terrorist attack, and the 2008-2009 global economic turmoil (Figure 1). Thanks 
to its sustained outstanding GDP growth over the past five decades, Singapore has 
become one the world’s wealthiest nations in terms of gross national income per 
capita measured in purchasing power parity (PPP) terms.5  
 
2.2. Challenges ahead 
In spite of its remarkable economic growth, Singapore faces formidable challenges 
ahead in building sustainable prosperity. Some of these challenges are associated with 
the country’s recent growth pattern, in which GDP growth has been driven strongly 
by employment expansion contributed by an influx of immigrant workers, while its 
labor productivity growth has been sluggish.  
 
                                                
2 Ministry of Trade and Industry, The Strategic Economic Plan Towards A Developed Nation, Report 
of the Economic Planning Committee, 1991.  
3 For a detailed discussion, see Huff (1997). 
4 In 2007, the manufacturing sector’s value added accounted for 25% of GDP in Singapore, whereas 
this figure was only 2.5% for Hong Kong (Source: World Development Indicators). 
5 In 2010, Singapore’s GNI per capita was PPP$54,700, while this figure was 47,300 for Hong Kong, 




It is important to notice that labor productivity and its growth are important indicators 
of economic performance. On the theoretical ground, Jones (1997) pointed out that 
labor productivity is a more reliable measure compared to per capita income in 
capturing the wealth level of a nation. The labor productivity (measured as GDP or 
value-added per effective worker or man-hour) has been widely used in analyzing 
economic performance and the trend of convergence or divergence among countries.6 
While TFP growth remains an important indicator on technological progress and the 
economy’s efficient use of production inputs, ALP growth is a practical measure that 
can be used to monitor the economy’s progress toward higher value-added structures7. 
As Sargent and Rodriguez (2000, p. 43) pointed out, “In new growth models in which 
physical capital accumulation is the engine of growth, capital intensity drives TFP 
growth, not the other way around. Therefore trends in capital accumulation [which is 
captured by ALP growth] are more relevant for examining the growth process than 
are trends in TFP growth.” In fact, ALP to some extent reflects the sophistication of 
an economy and its industries and it is a meaningful indicator of the pace of structural 
change and the vibrancy of innovation activities (Dowrick, 1989; Katz, 2000; 
O’Leary, 2003; and O’Mahony and Ark, 2003). In addition, Porter (2003) also 
showed that labor productivity is a determinant of prosperity and competitiveness. 
 
On the practical ground, labor productivity has become a main priority and strategic 
focus of policy makers in many countries, especially the Organization for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) nations (Ahmad et al., 2003). In fact, 
governments across OECD countries are seeking to promote economic growth with 
policy reforms aimed at fostering labour productivity growth (OECD, 2008). It is also 
important to note that it is more practical and feasible to monitor and compare labor 
productivity level and growth across countries/sectors over time because the 
measurement of labor productivity is straightforward and its related data is timely 
available at all levels (economy, sector, sub-sector, and firm). 
 
Concerning labor productivity, Singapore is facing two main challenges. The first 
challenge is related to Singapore’s relative low labor productivity level. It average 
labor productivity (ALP) is still well below the corresponding US level, which is the 
typical benchmark used in economic growth literature. Taking the corresponding U.S. 
levels as 100, Singapore’s ALP was around 60 or below for the economy level; the 
second challenge is Singapore’s lack of robustness in catching up with the U.S. on 
ALP: Singapore’s ALP relative to the US declined during 2001-2009 (Figure 2).  
 
These two challenges are faced not only by the traditional sectors such as 
Manufacturing, Hotels and Restaurants, and Construction; but also by the advanced 
industries with high shares of skilled labor such as Information and Communications, 
and Financial Services (Figure 2). For example, the ALP of Singapore’s Information 
and Communications sector relative to the US declined from below 50% in 2001 to 
below 35% in 2009 (Figure 2). 
 
                                                
6 The studies along this line include Abramovitz (1986), Baumol (1986), Dollar and Wolff (1988, 
1993), Dowrick and Nguyen (1989), De Long (1992), Bernard and Jones (1995), Jones (1997), Hall 
and Jones (1997), Dunford and Smith (2000), Katz (2000), and McQuinn and Whelan (2007).  
7 It is worth noting that labor productivity has some limitations relative to the TFP measure. For 
example, it masks economies of scale while TFP growth can pick up on these issues (Mahadevan 
2004). 
 7 
Figure 2. Singapore’s ALP relative to the US level (US=100), 2001-2009 
 
Data sources: Singapore Department of Statistics (for Singapore); Bureau of Economic Analysis (for 
the US). 
In comparisons to its peer, Singapore paled beside Hong Kong in recent decades. In 
terms of the long-term growth trend based on the 10-Year Moving Average (10-
YMA)8 growth, Hong Kong overtook Singapore on ALP since 2007 and this gap has 
widened since then. At the same time, Singapore’s 10-YMA GDP growth has a 
downward trend, while that of Hong Kong has shown notable improvement. These 
comparisons suggest that Singapore should rethink its current growth model to sustain 
its high economic performance in the long-term. 
 
Figure 3. GDP and ALP Growth Trends: Singapore vs. Hong Kong 
 
Data source: Total Economy Dataset, Conference Board 
  
3. Decomposition Framework 
                                                
 8 The 10-YMA of variable X at year t is computed as 10/)...( 921 −−− ++++ tttt XXXX . 
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This section investigates the sources of Singapore’s economic growth since 1965. 
Because the detailed data such as capital investment flows is not available for 2009 
and 2010, the investigation focuses on the 1965-2008 timeframe. 
 
This exercise uses the standard growth decomposition framework employed by the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) for measuring 
aggregate and industry-level productivity growth, which is elaborated in OECD 
(2001). The methodology was introduced by Solow (1957, 1960) and developed 
considerably by Dale Jorgenson, Zvi Griliches, and Erwin Diewert (OECD, 2001, p. 
18).9 Assume that the aggregate production function takes the form 
),,,(. LKKKXAY METEBS= ,    (1) 
where gross domestic product Y  is produced from aggregate factor input X , which 
incorporates capital services K  and labor employed L . K  is rendered using three 
types of capital assets: nonresidential business structures ( BSK ), transport equipment (
TEK ), and machinery and equipment ( MEK ). Productivity is represented as the Hicks-
neutral augmentation of aggregate input ( A ). It is important to note that this 
decomposition framework is more advanced than the traditional approach based on 
the simple Cobb-Douglas function. As elaborated in Appendix 2, this method uses the 
concept of capital services, which takes into account the user’s costs of capital for 
different asset types to estimate the contribution of capital to growth.  
 
Under the neoclassical assumptions of competitive markets and constant returns to 
scale, Equation 1 can be transformed into a growth accounting decomposition as 
follows:  
ALKKKY LMEKTEKBSK METEBS lnlnlnlnlnln Δ+Δ+Δ+Δ+Δ=Δ νννν ,  (2) 
where ν is the average percentage of total factor income represented by the 
subscripted input over the two periods of the change. All variables are expressed in 
logarithmic first differences ( lnΔ ) to indicate their growth rates. The assumption of 
constant returns to scale of the aggregate input function implies that  
  LKKKK METEBS ννννν −=++= 1 .        (3) 
Equation 2 implies that GDP growth is driven by three main sources:  
• Capital input ( MEKTEKBSK KKK METEBS lnlnln Δ+Δ+Δ ννν ) 
• Labor input ( LL lnΔν ), and  
•   TFP growth ( AlnΔ ). 
Combining Equations (2) and (3) creates a framework for decomposing the sources of 
average labor productivity (ALP) growth, LYy /= , as  
Akkky MEKTEKBSK METEBS lnlnlnlnln Δ+Δ+Δ+Δ=Δ ννν ,          (4) 
where LKk ii /=  is referred to as capital deepening in capital assets 
{ });;( METEBSii ∈  
 
                                                
9 While there are other frameworks for decomposing the sources of growth such as those based on the 
Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) and Transcendental Logarithmic (translog) functions, the 
method adopted by OECD has proved to be a consistent and well-founded approach, which effectively 
integrates the production function theory with national accounts (OECD, 2001).  
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Equation (4) shows that ALP growth is driven by two main sources: 
The contribution of capital deepening ( MEKTEKBSK kkk METEBS lnlnln Δ+Δ+Δ ννν ) and 
TFP growth ( AlnΔ ). 
 
Equations (2), (3), and (4) also imply that 
LyY lnlnln Δ+Δ=Δ .     (5) 
That is, GDP growth is driven by two sources: ALP growth ( ylnΔ ) and the 
contribution of employment expansion ( LlnΔ ). The share of labor productivity 
growth in GDP growth computed as Yy ln/ln ΔΔ indicates the extent to which GDP 
growth is driven by labor productivity growth, which is associated with improvements 
in a nation’s competitiveness and standards of living. If this percentage declines, it 
implies that GDP growth is increasingly driven by employment expansion.  
 
Growth decomposition based on the frameworks presented above requires an 
estimation of the percentage of income driven by labor and capital inputs, capital 
stock and capital services. The details of these estimation procedures are provided in 
the Appendices at the end of this paper. 
 
4. Growth Decomposition Results 
 
4.1. The sources of growth by period 
The results indicating the sources of Singapore’ economic growth in its four periods 
of development — 1965–1980, 1980–1990, 1990–2000, and 2000–2008 — are shown 
in Table 2.  
 
Table 2. Sources of GDP and ALP growth, 1965–2008 
 1965-1980 1980-1990 1990-2000 2000-2008 
GDP Growth (% points) 
GDP growth (I) 9.7 7.2 7.3 4.7 
Contribution of capital 7.9 3.8 3.8 2.3 
Contribution of labor 1.9 1.4 2.1 1.9 
TFP growth −0.1 2.0 1.4 0.5 
Structure (%) 
Real GDP growth 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Contribution of capital 81.1 52.8 52.4 48.4 
Contribution of labor 20.1 19.8 28.4 41.0 
TFP growth −1.2 27.4 19.2 10.6 
ALP Growth (% points) 
ALP growth (II) 5.9 4.4 3.4 0.9 
Capital deepening 6.0 2.4 2.0 0.4 
TFP growth −0.1 2.0 1.4 0.5 
Structure (%) 
ALP growth 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Capital deepening 102.0 54.9 59.2 43.8 
TFP growth −2.0 45.1 40.8 56.2 
Share of ALP Growth in GDP Growth (%) 
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(II)/(I) 61.2 60.9 47.1 18.9 
During the first period (1965–1980), Singapore achieved an outstanding GDP growth 
rate of 9.7%, of which 81.1% was due to capital accumulation. The contribution of 
labor was 1.9%, accounting for 20.1% of GDP growth. In contrast, TFP growth 
averaged −0.1% (Table 2) despite Singapore’s outstanding GDP growth, and this 
discrepancy has sparked concerns regarding Singapore’s degree of technological 
progress (Tsao, 1982, 1985; Kim and Lau, 1994). Although TFP growth was 
negligible, ALP growth during this period was strong at 5.9% and was totally driven 
by robust capital deepening (6%). During this period, ALP growth accounted for 
61.2% of GDP growth (Table 2), which means that economic growth was largely 
driven by improvements in labor productivity. 
  
In the second period (1980–1990), the government policies launched in the late 1970s 
and early 1980s to restructure industry with a focus on high-tech manufacturing and 
high value-added services produced encouraging results. The GDP grew 7.2%, with a 
significant contribution from TFP growth (2% or a 27.4% share). ALP growth was 
4.4% and accounted for nearly 61% of GDP growth (Table 2). Furthermore, ALP 
growth was driven almost equally by capital deepening (2.4%) and TFP growth 
(2.0%). These results are consistent with those of Toh and Ng (2002) and Akkemik 
(2007), who found that TFP growth was negligible in the early stages of Singapore’s 
development but that it has substantially increased since the late 1980s. 
Chongvilaivan (2012), who examined Singapore’s manufacturing sector during 1976-
2004, showed that learning effects and high-tech capital deepening contributed 
significantly to TFP growth and the contribution of the former was larger than the 
latter. On the other hand, the heavy capital accumulation in the previous period, which 
built the foundation for long-term growth, might also have contributed to this 
improvement in performance.  
 
In the third period (1990–2000), GDP growth was nearly the same as in the second 
period at 7.3%. However, relative to the second period, GDP growth in the third 
period was driven more by employment expansion (with 2.1% or a 28.4% share) and 
less by TFP growth (with 1.4% or a 19.2% share). Furthermore, the ALP growth rate 
was 3.4%, 1% point below the rate in the second period (Table 2). This gap was 
caused by both the lower contribution of capital deepening (which fell from 2.4% to 
2.0%) and the lower level of TFP growth (which fell from 2.0% to 1.4%). It is also 
important to note that the contribution of ALP growth to GDP growth in 1990–2000 
fell to 47.1% from 60.9% in 1980–1990 (Table 2). 
 
GDP growth in the fourth period (2000–2008) experienced a sharp drop, falling to 
4.7%. This slowdown was largely caused by the sharp decreases in the capital 
contribution (from 3.8% in 1980–1990 and 1990–2000 to 2.3% in 2000–2008) and 
TFP (from 2.0% in 1980–1990 and 1.4% in 1990–2000 to 0.5% in 2000–2008). 
Conversely, the contribution of labor remained high at 1.9%, whereas ALP growth in 
this period fell considerably to 0.9%, to which capital deepening contributed only 
0.4% (Table 2). Furthermore, the contribution of ALP growth to GDP growth during 
this period was surprisingly small (18.9%). 
 
The sources of Singapore’s GDP and ALP growth as presented above indicate three 
important trends that will pose a challenge to Singapore’s growth in the coming years. 
First, ALP growth, especially the share of ALP growth in GDP growth, declined. ALP 
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growth fell from 5.9% in 1965–1980 to 4.4%, 3.4%, and 0.5% in 1980–1990, 1990–
2000, and 2000–2008, respectively. The contribution of ALP to GDP growth also fell 
sharply, especially in the last two periods, with a decrease from approximately 61% in 
the first two periods to 47.1% in 1990–2000 and 18.9% in 2000–2008. Secondly, the 
contribution of capital deepening to ALP growth declined over time: from 6.0% 
points in 1965–1980 to 2.4%, 2.0%, and 0.4% in 1980–1990, 1990–2000, and 2000–
2008, respectively. Thirdly, Singapore tried to maintain a large share of labor 
contribution to GDP growth by increasingly relying on cheap foreign labor. (Table 2) 
 
Subsection 4.2 examines the trends and patterns in GDP and ALP growth and their 
sources using the 10-YMA measure. This examination provides further insight into 
the policy challenges complicating the question of Singapore’s future growth. 
 
4.2. Driving factors of GDP and ALP growth trends  
Both GDP and ALP growth followed downward-sloping trends. Their trend lines 
exhibit high predictive power (R2=0.65 for GDP growth and 0.55 for ALP growth) 
and a large negative slope β (β=−0.11 for GDP growth and −0.09 for ALP growth). 
These figures indicate that on average, 10-YMA growth decreased by 1.1% points for 
GDP and 0.9% points for ALP. (Figure 4). 
 
Figure 4. Trends of GDP and ALP growth 
 
 
The declining trends in GDP and ALP growth have been particularly pronounced over 
the past two decades. 10-YMA GDP growth fell from 7.5% in 1998 to 5.4% in 2008, 
whereas 10-YMA ALP growth declined from 3.1% in 1998 to 2.0% in 2008. The 
decreasing trend in GDP and ALP growth in Singapore is consistent with the 
“convergence effect” found in the economic growth literature: nations tend to grow 
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more slowly as their wealth increases.10 Although decreasing trends in GDP and ALP 
growth are unavoidable, ALP growth has tended to decline more rapidly than GDP 
growth. In fact, the contribution of ALP growth to GDP growth (using the 10-YMA 
measure) declined from 57.9% in 1988 to 41% in 1998 and 37% in 2008. These 
figures indicate that Singapore’s GDP growth was increasingly dependent on 
employment expansion during this interval (Figure 5). 
 
Figure 5. The declining trend of the share of ALP growth in GDP growth 
 
 
It is also important to note that GDP and ALP growth (based on the 10-YMA 
measure) did not steadily fall over time. Instead, there were some periods of 
resurgence. 10-YMA GDP growth was stable and surged from 1986 to 1996 (Figure 
4, Table 3a), whereas 10-YMA ALP growth increased from 1983–1996 (Figure 4, 
Table 3b). These observations suggest that policy initiatives and external factors also 
played an important role in Singapore’s economic performance.  
 
The remainder of this section investigates the changes in the sources of GDP and ALP 
growth. This analysis will elucidate the factors driving the declining trends and 
periodic resurgence in GDP and ALP growth. 
 
Figure 6a. The sources of GDP growth 
 
                                                
10 Barro (1991) and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) estimate that per capita incomes tend to converge 














Contribution (% points) Contribution Share (%) 
Capital Labor TFP Capital Labor TFP 
1975 10.4 9.3 1.8 −0.6 88.7 16.9 −5.6 
1976 10.1 9.3 1.8 −1.1 92.5 18.0 −10.4 
1977 9.7 9.0 1.9 −1.2 92.6 19.3 −12.0 
1978 9.2 8.5 2.0 −1.2 92.3 21.2 −13.4 
1979 8.9 8.0 2.2 −1.3 89.9 24.5 −14.4 
1980 8.5 7.4 2.3 −1.2 86.6 27.3 −13.9 
1981 8.3 6.8 2.4 −0.9 81.3 28.9 −10.2 
1982 7.7 6.2 2.4 −0.9 80.2 31.6 −11.8 
1983 7.5 5.7 2.3 −0.5 76.3 30.9 −7.2 
1984 7.7 5.2 2.2 0.3 68.0 28.1 3.9 
1985 7.2 4.9 1.8 0.5 67.8 24.8 7.4 
1986 6.7 4.5 1.3 0.8 67.9 19.8 12.3 
1987 6.9 4.3 1.4 1.2 62.8 19.9 17.3 
1988 7.2 4.1 1.5 1.5 57.9 21.1 21.1 
1989 7.2 4.0 1.4 1.8 55.0 19.6 25.3 
1990 7.2 3.8 1.4 2.0 52.8 19.8 27.4 
1991 6.9 3.6 1.3 2.0 51.8 19.6 28.6 
1992 6.8 3.4 1.2 2.2 49.5 18.2 32.3 
1993 7.1 3.3 1.3 2.5 46.3 18.2 35.5 
1994 7.4 3.3 1.5 2.6 44.7 19.7 35.6 
1995 8.3 3.4 1.9 3.0 41.1 22.8 36.1 
1996 8.8 3.7 2.5 2.7 41.6 27.8 30.6 
1997 8.7 3.9 2.5 2.2 45.2 29.2 25.6 
1998 7.5 4.0 2.4 1.1 54.0 31.6 14.4 
1999 7.2 4.0 2.1 1.1 54.9 29.3 15.8 
2000 7.3 3.8 2.1 1.4 52.4 28.4 19.2 
2001 6.4 3.7 2.0 0.7 57.2 31.3 11.5 
2002 6.2 3.5 1.8 1.0 55.9 28.2 15.9 
2003 5.5 3.2 1.5 0.8 58.6 27.6 13.8 
2004 5.3 3.0 1.4 0.9 56.6 25.9 17.5 
2005 5.2 2.8 1.3 1.1 53.8 25.4 20.8 
2006 5.2 2.6 1.3 1.4 48.8 25.0 26.1 
2007 5.2 2.4 1.4 1.4 46.1 27.1 26.8 





Changing patterns in the sources of GDP growth  
The three sources of GDP growth (based on the 10-YMA measure) are graphed in 
Figure 6a. Although the contribution of capital declined, that of labor was essentially 
stable, and that of TFP growth exhibited decisive improvement after 1984. The 
contribution of capital to growth (based on the 10-YMA measure) fell from 9.3% in 
1975 to 4.9%, 3.4%, 2.8%, and 2.4% points in 1985, 1995, 2005, and 2008, 
respectively (Table 3a). Meanwhile, during the same years, the contribution of labor 
was 1.8%, 1.8%, 1.9%, 1.3%, and 1.7%, and that of TFP growth was −0.6%, 0.5%, 
3.0%, 1.1%, and 1.3% (Table 3a). This examination thus shows that the decline in 
capital contribution was the sole cause of the decline in GDP growth. 
 





















1975 7.1 7.6 −0.6 108.3 −8.3 
1976 6.6 7.7 −1.1 116.0 −16.0 
1977 6.1 7.3 −1.2 119.1 −19.1 
1978 5.5 6.7 −1.2 122.6 −22.6 
1979 4.7 6.0 −1.3 127.2 −27.2 
1980 4.0 5.2 −1.2 129.5 −29.5 
1981 3.6 4.5 −0.9 123.5 −23.5 
1982 3.0 3.9 −0.9 130.6 −30.6 
1983 3.0 3.5 −0.5 118.1 −18.1 
1984 3.5 3.2 0.3 91.5 8.5 
1985 3.7 3.1 0.5 85.6 14.4 
1986 4.0 3.2 0.8 79.5 20.5 
1987 4.1 3.0 1.2 71.3 28.7 
1988 4.1 2.6 1.5 63.6 36.4 
1989 4.4 2.5 1.8 58.3 41.7 
1990 4.4 2.4 2.0 54.9 45.1 
1991 4.3 2.3 2.0 53.9 46.1 
1992 4.4 2.2 2.2 50.2 49.8 
1993 4.6 2.1 2.5 45.4 54.6 
1994 4.6 2.0 2.6 42.7 57.3 
1995 4.7 1.7 3.0 36.5 63.5 
1996 4.2 1.5 2.7 36.1 63.9 
1997 3.9 1.7 2.2 43.4 56.6 
1998 3.1 2.0 1.1 64.8 35.2 
1999 3.3 2.1 1.1 65.2 34.8 
2000 3.4 2.0 1.4 59.2 40.8 
2001 2.7 2.0 0.7 72.7 27.3 
2002 2.9 2.0 1.0 66.5 33.5 
2003 2.6 1.9 0.8 71.5 28.5 
2004 2.7 1.8 0.9 66.0 34.0 
2005 2.7 1.6 1.1 59.8 40.2 
2006 2.7 1.3 1.4 49.4 50.6 
2007 2.4 1.0 1.4 42.3 57.7 




Changing patterns in the sources of ALP growth  
Figure 6b depicts the sources of ALP growth. It is obvious that the contribution of 
capital deepening severely declined, whereas TFP growth became a major source of 
ALP growth after the mid-1980s. The contribution of capital deepening (based on the 
10-YMA measure) fell from 7.6% in 1975 to 3.1%, 1.7%, 1.6%, and 0.7% in 1985, 
1995, 2005, and 2008, respectively, whereas the contribution of TFP to ALP growth 
in the same years was −8.3%, 14.4%, 63.5%, 40.2%, and 65.3% (Table 3b). These 
results indicate that the decreased contribution of capital deepening was the major 
factor in the declining trend of ALP growth.  
 
5. Policy challenges and recommendations 
  
5.1. Policy issues  
As presented in Section 2, labor productivity is a key measure of economic 
performance, which determines a country’s international competitiveness and living 
standards. While Singapore’s economic performance over the past 4-5 decades is 
miraculous, its challenges associated with labor productivity remain formidable. It 
appears that it will take a long way for Singapore to catch up with the US on the ALP 
level. One can estimate that if the two countries maintain their 1998–2008 ALP 
growth rates, it will take more than 120 years for Singapore to catch up with the US 
on this measure.11 Therefore, ALP growth should be the primary focus of Singapore’s 
economic policy in the coming years. 
 
The analyses in Section 4 provide several policy insights that should help Singapore 
to boost its ALP growth. First, it is imperative that Singapore reverses the sharply 
declining trend in the contribution of capital deepening. Secondly, Singapore must 
maintain and strengthen its fairly healthy level of TFP growth. 
 
The declining trend in the contribution of capital deepening was driven by the 
decrease in the rate of capital accumulation in Singapore, especially after the 1997–
1998 Asian financial crisis, although the economy maintained a high rate of 
employment expansion. There are three possible factors in these dynamics. Firstly, 
businesses in Singapore appeared to find it more profitable to substitute labor for 
capital because they had good access to inexpensive labor. In fact, the number of 
foreign workers rose from 21,000 (3.2% of the workforce) in 1970 to 120,000 (7.4%) 
in 1980, 248,000 (16.1%) in 1990, and 612,000 (29.2%) in 2000. The majority of 
these individuals were low-skilled workers12 (Yeoh, 2007). At the same time, 
Singapore’s trend of underinvestment relative to its employment expansion has 
become increasingly evident since 2005 (Figure 7). 
  
Figure 7: Trends of Singapore’s Investment Intensity and Employment Growth 
                                                
11 For country X (with productivity 0x in year 0 and ALP growth rate Xg ) to catch up with country Y 













Over 1998-2008, Singapore’s ALP growth was around 2.0%, while this rate was 1.6% for the US. 




Secondly, the government may have prioritized GDP growth at the cost of ALP 
growth. Because GDP growth is an important performance indicator that affects the 
pay that government officials receive (Blöndal, 2006), the government tends to have a 
strong incentive to promote GDP growth. As a result, the government may have 
encouraged employment expansion at the cost of ALP growth. Thirdly, because of the 
accelerated rate of globalization that occurred with the rise of Asia, firms may have 
been able to achieve higher returns on capital investment elsewhere outside of 
Singapore.  
 
The next subsection suggests policy approaches that may help Singapore to 
effectively address the challenges to its ALP growth as presented above. 
 
5.2. Policy recommendations  
 
Any policy that helps Singapore enhance its long-term economic performance must 
focus on ALP growth in addition to TFP growth and help the economy to constantly 
transition into higher value-added activities.  
The endeavor to promote ALP growth in Singapore should center on three 
approaches: i) eliminating policies biased towards business expansion at the cost of 
ALP growth; (ii) establishing an effective mechanism for monitoring ALP growth in 
every industry and economic sector; and (iii) utilizing a strategic framework to launch 
policies and initiatives intended to boost ALP growth. 
 
Removing the policies that may dampen ALP growth 
 
There are several policies that can encourage businesses to expand at the cost of ALP 
growth. One such policy is heavy reliance on simple measures such as increases in 
value-added, revenues, employment, or exports as key performance indicators, which 
 19 
can attract attention at the expense of ALP growth. These methods of performance 
measurement may encourage businesses to achieve growth through employment 
expansion or by shifting towards lower value-added activities. Another policy bias is 
the provision of easy access to immigrant workers without labor productivity 
performance monitoring.  
 
Establishing an effective system for monitoring ALP growth in the sector 
To boost ALP growth, the government and business associations need to establish an 
effective system for monitoring ALP growth in every industry. This system should 
include a productivity database based on international benchmarks and regular 
surveys and roundtable discussions intended to improve comprehension of the 
dynamics of ALP growth in every industry and every economic sector. This system 
should provide insights and evidence that will assist in the introduction and 
monitoring of policy initiatives intended to foster ALP growth. 
  
Utilizing a strategic framework for formulating policy initiatives to boost ALP growth 
 
Figure 8 provides a strategic framework for designing policy initiatives to boost ALP 
growth in a given industry. This framework consists of two major dimensions. One 
dimension aims to help firms make incremental improvements to increase ALP, and 
the other seeks to enable firms to undertake transformational efforts to boost their 
ALP. 
 
There are two measures of incremental improvement: increase in output per worker 
and increase in value per unit of output. The set of policy initiatives that aims to help 
firms increase output per worker should include provisions for training and worker 
reallocation across firms and industries. In addition, this set of policy initiatives 
should help firms to upgrade their production equipment and management through tax 
incentives or through the diffusion of technology information and best practices. The 
set of policy initiatives that aims to assist firms in increasing the value generated per 
unit of output should be more closely related to innovation and competition policy. 
 
To encourage firms to transition into higher value-added activities, policy initiatives 
should focus on exhorting firms to revise their business strategies and on addressing 
the factors that facilitate business transformation. Firms should be incentivized to 
revise business strategies in order to increase ALP growth and move toward higher 
value-added activities. There should also be support available for local firms to 
expand globally. Policy initiatives that help to facilitate the transition into higher 
value-added activities might include those that increase the availability of labor skills 
and capital for such activities, provide better access to up-to-date market and 
technology information, and revise regulations to facilitate merger and acquisition 
(M&A) activities and foster competition.  
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Appendix 1: Income shares of labor and capital inputs 
Let us begin with the national income identity (from Singapore’s Annual Yearbook of 
Statistics): 
SDTPIGOSOGOSCEY ++++=   (A1) 
where Y is the GDP, CE represents ‘Employee Compensation’, GOS  is ‘Gross 
Operating Surplus’, GOSO is the ‘Gross Operating Surplus of Others’,13 TPI is ‘Taxes 
on Production & Imports’, and SD represents ‘Statistical Discrepancies’. Assume that 
the contribution of labor income to the three ambiguous items — GOSO, TPI, and SD 
— is the same as its contribution to the overall economy Lv . Equation (A1) implies 
that the total contribution of labor input to GDP is 
)( SDTPIGOSOvCEYv LL +++=   (A2) 
Equation (A2) can be rewritten to estimate the labor income share as  
SDTPIGOSOY
CEvL −−−
=   (A3) 
 
Under the neoclassical assumption of constant returns to scale, the income share of 
capital can simply be computed as LK vv −=1 . 
 
Appendix 2: Capital Stocks and Capital Services  
 
Capital Stocks  
The quantity of capital stock for asset type i  is determined using the ‘perpetual 










iTiiTiTi IISS δδ   (A4) 
where TiS ,  is the capital stock in year T for capital asset type i , iδ  is the constant rate 
of geometric depreciation,14 and 028.0=iδ  for BSi =  (nonresidential business 
structures), 191.0=iδ  for TEi =  (transport equipment), and 125.0=iδ  for MEi =  
(machinery and equipment). tTiI −,  is the constant price investment flow in year tT − .  
 
Capital Services 
The procedure used to estimate the capital services rendered by a given type of capital 
asset was presented by Jorgenson, Ho, and Stiroh (2005). The procedure requires the 
estimation of the quantity of capital services, the rental price of those capital services, 
the contribution of the capital asset to income, and the ex-post nominal rate of return.     
 
The quantity of capital services rendered by capital asset type i in year T is defined as 







   
(A5) 
The rental price Tic ,  of capital services from capital asset type i  in period T  is 
obtained using the assumption that the typical investor in period 1−T  who invests in 
                                                
13 The ‘Others’ category here includes unincorporated firms and nonprofit institutions.  
14 These geometric depreciation rates originally appeared in Jorgenson, Ho, and Stiroh (2005) and 
Timmer, Ypma, and Ark (2003).   
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this capital asset at price 1, −Tip  will obtain a return rate that will justify the nominal 
rate of return Tr  observed for the economy and the market price of the remaining 
value of the asset in year T. Under the market equilibrium condition, this assumption 
implies that 
TiiTiTTi pcrp ,,1, )1()1( δ−+=+−  (A6) 
 
Equation (A6) suggests the formula for computing the rental price Tic ,  
1,,,1,, −− −+= TiTiTiiTiTTi ppprc πδ  (A7) 
where 1,1,,, /)( −−−= TiTiTiTi pppπ  is the asset’s price change over the period.  
 
The contribution to income Ti,ν  of capital services rendered by capital good i in year 








, =ν   (A8) 
where TY  is the GDP in current prices in year T . 
 
The nominal rate of return Tr  is determined as follows. The contribution to income of 




TiKv ,ν  (A9)  









, πδ  (A10)  
 
Therefore, the nominal rate of return Tr  (based on the ex-post approach), can be 






















  (A11) 
 
 
